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ABSTRACT
This dissertation offers a discourse analytic approach to representations of ‘security’ and 
its performative functions through an examination of the governance of electronic crime 
(or ‘cyber-security’) in New Zealand. Drawing from Jef Huysmans and the Stockholm 
School’s (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, etc.) approach to securitization, the question of ‘the 
real’ is bracketed to paint a picture of something like a semiotic regime where, following 
from ontological insecurity and inchoate fears about the unknown in late modernity, 
surveillance and monitoring are employed by government and private enterprises in 
information-gathering practices to categorize strangers into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies,’ 
danger subsequently concretized in synoptic and mediated representations of what should 
be of common concern. This is argued to create a perception of determinability in terms 
of being able to locate ‘real’ unknown threats, which in turn creates further ontological 
insecurities about not being able to deal with such politicized insecurities (in addition to 
the potentially limitless realm of unknown fears). This is portrayed as an ‘(in)security 
reflex,’ a process that serves particular interests where ‘security’ utterances are employed 
with the goal of creating perceptions of merit (the participants involved in this process 
scarcely constructing pictures o f ‘real’ merit, differing from crime-preventive mentalities) 
to enhance the perceived legitimacy of commercial and government security providers. 
Such enterprises are shown to thrive in realms of indeterminability, (in)security then 
being a particularly opportunistic enterprise as new threats could potentially be created ad 
infinitum.
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INTRODUCTION
Though ‘security’ is a word frequently on the lips of politicians, media spokespersons 
and commercial security providers who have made a business out of its utterance, it has 
yet to escape its self-referential paradigm in public discourse. In New Zealand, concern 
about the borderless nature of electronic communications and the potential for infiltration 
by unknown (foreign) threats has translated into legislation providing increased 
monitoring capabilities for government agencies, as well as the creation of the Centre for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CCIP), a ‘watch and warn’ service that provides 
information about potential threats to critical infrastructure providers. Being a site that 
has been blooming with new enterprises that seek to address the issue of security, this 
research will examine New Zealand’s regulation of electronic crime in order to wade 
through the murky waters in which ‘security’ is submerged to evaluate its performative 
functions.
The conceptual framework and analysis offered here is extrapolated from 
qualitative data representing a pool of thirty semi-structured interviews that addressed a 
wide array of issues surrounding security and regulation of electronic networks; these 
often pertained to the internet, under the rubric of ‘cyber-security.’ Interviews were 
obtained through a chain-referral model, participants then representing diverse 
backgrounds and organisations including commercial security consultants, individuals 
from various departments within police services, the CCIP, the Internet Society of New 
Zealand, the Cyber Crime Centre, the Censorship Compliance Unit, political parties, 
watchdog organisations, critical infrastructure providers, independent security 
contractors, network engineers, systems administrators, and internet service providers 
(ISPs)
In this paper I will draw from Jef Huysmans and follow the Stockholm school 
(Waever, Buzan, etc.) in conceptualizing the regulation of electronic crime as a process of 
securitization (ex: ‘cyber-security’). This means I will bracket the question of 'the real' 
and proceed by developing a diagram of the interaction between information-gathering
1 Ethics for the interviews was cleared through the Human Ethics Committee at Victory University o f  
Wellington, New Zealand. Interviews were conducted between January and August 2002. Interviews are 
referenced here as P01, P02, etc.
1
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and monitoring, the categorization of security into politics, and the concretization of 
dangers that 'started' as ontological insecurity. In this regard, I acknowledge that I am 
choosing as a starting point some notion of the existence of real insecurities that are 
parlayed into discursive and politicized instruments and that my argument is prone to 
Andrew Neal's (2006) critique where security’s exceptionalism is distinguished from the 
norm, and the critique that securitization already takes on too much from the classic, 
liberal, modernist version to remake the image of security. My response to this is that the 
field both of security studies and securitization is already thickly construed by each of 
these dimensions: classical thought, liberal categories, modernist doubt. In other words, 
this paper is situated more closely between the Stockholm and Parisian schools of 
security studies and intends to elaborate the securitization process with reference to the 
establishment of a governance regime for electronic crime in New Zealand3.
What follows is, firstly, a review of concepts informing the analysis of the 
interviews on which this research is based, emphasizing the discursive functionality of 
security. Secondly, it will be argued that the construction of security agendas in New 
Zealand, particularly with relation to ‘cyber-security,’ reflected an effects-based 
govemmentality where perceived credibility overshadowed actual danger prevention; 
here, success was often contingent on creating ontological insecurity (fear of not 
knowing). Thirdly is an examination of new enterprises that have emerged in New 
Zealand to provide services or legislation to address perceived dangers. Fourthly, trust, 
and its relation to monitoring is discussed within the context of security, informed by 
monitoring practises in New Zealand. Finally, the politicization of security will be 
evaluated, ultimately arguing that ontological insecurities created by fabricated danger 
are part of a reflexive cycle that perpetuates insecurity.
SECURITY AND THE ‘WILL TO TRUTH’
Jef Huysmans (1998) has suggested that the realm of ‘the political’ is becoming 
increasingly entangled with security -  interpreted as a life strategy; a culturally- 
established practice to mediate our relation to death -  in a reflexive process of
2 For a discussion o f different security ‘schools’ and their critical approaches to security, see C.A.S.E. 
(Critical Approaches to Security in Europe) COLLECTIVE, 2006.
3 1 acknowledge Willem de Lint here for providing recommendations for the thrust of this paragraph.
2
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(re)substantiation. The wider performative functions that follow from decisively crafted 
security utterances are, however, often overlooked in lieu of security studies that seek to 
define security (condensing meaning into a statement), or offer conceptual analyses 
(formulating a common denominator with which to organise an explicit meaning). 
Huysmans argues that, though an increasing degree of sophistication follows from the 
former to the latter approach, neither have sufficiently dealt with the meaning of security 
-  that is, the signifying work of the noun ‘security’ itself, and thus, further studies in this 
purview should seek to address security from a ‘thick signifier’ approach (1998:226-239).
In this vein, Huysmans draws from Michel Foucault’s contributions to 
understanding orders of discourse, whereby he unpacks the ‘will to truth’ (Foucault, 
1971:10) present in axiomatic understandings of security by recognizing what might be 
seen as a system of exclusion that creates a division governing the process of 
development in our ‘will to knowledge’ (Foucault, 1971:10). Systems of exclusion, such 
as those rooted in the ‘will to truth,’ are rendered possible through institutional support 
and the subsequent ways that knowledge, thus affected, finds itself proliferating in 
society. This “tends to exercise a sort of pressure, a power of constraint upon other forms 
of discourse” (Foucault, 1971:11). This perhaps deserves some clarification to avoid that 
which might seem inaccessibly abstruse.
Elaborating on what is meant by security as a signifier, meaning for the signifier 
can be seen to derive from a process of differentiation from other signifiers (‘security’ is 
not ‘virus’) in a chain of signifiers (‘security is threatened by increased connectivity to 
the internet’). Huysmans refers to the register of meaning that is articulated in employing 
‘security’ as a ‘security formation,’ which provides intelligibility -  what the ‘thickness’ 
refers to. As such, ‘security’ is not a “neutral device,” but rather, “has a history and 
implies a meaning, a particular signification of social relations” (1998:228). The signifier 
‘security’ acquires a performative function (rather than merely being descriptive) where 
“‘security’ becomes self-referential. It does not refer to an external, objective reality but 
establishes a security situation in itself,” its own enunciation constituting an ‘(in)security 
condition’ (Huysmans, 1998:232). The usage of ‘security,’ then, involves a process that 
activates the politics of the signifier, thus ordering social relations. A research agenda 
that follows from an examination of the thick signifier then “explores this register of
3
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meaning and differences or changes in the register according to the concrete contexts in 
which ‘security’ is used” (Huysmans, 1998:228) -  essentially, discourse analytic a la 
Foucault.
Following the discursive formation of security within the field of International 
Relations, Huysmans derives two interdependent forms of security from a particular 
metaphysics of life located in the cultural tradition of modernity (1998:234): “ontological 
security, which concerns the mediation of chaos and order, and daily security, which 
concerns the mediation of friends and enemies” (1998:229). Foucault had also recognized 
that installation of security mechanisms are intended to bracket the random element in 
populations to optimize a state of life (Dillon, 2007:44). At the heart of this lies the 
extemalization of death from life, where death is something to be consciously postponed 
(Huysmans, 1998:245) -  a pale spectre that looms in the distance.
Formations of security policy around this extemalization of death has the 
consequence of further desire for knowledge, where death becomes an object we try to 
know, as well as creating a space within which agencies can appear to mediate and 
represent our relationship to death. Death, being the ultimate unknown, continually feeds 
this desire for knowledge. Mediations consist of the ‘founding’ of objects to concretize 
danger and those between the self and concretized danger (Huysmans, 1998:237). 
Security measures can then presume the function of negotiating the boundaries of who to 
fear (enemies) and who to trust (friends)4. This may be seen to have a lucidity-inducing 
effect on political identity where distinguishing between friends and enemies is seen to 
constitute ‘the political,’ distinct from social/economic worlds5. This relationship is 
reflexive, as security feeds the political inasmuch as political identity depends on a 
definition of ‘the other’ (enemies from friends) and political actors along the security 
continuum define further constmctions of security. This relationship is also deemed to be 
unstable in theory in that, were security policies aimed at eliminating threats successful, 
political identity would in turn be subjugated (Huysmans, 1998:239).
A problem unfolds where strategies of survival/counter-measures assume the 
possibility of determinability, the result being that ‘the void’ is hidden by these positive
4 The concept o f trust will be further elaborated on in subsequent sections.
5 Huysmans draws from Carl Schmitt (1932) here, though this has been taken up more recently by Chantal 
Mouffe (2005) in terms o f the political void created by the search for consensus.
4
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measures that rest on it. This feeds into an insecurity of not-knowing, where state security 
provisions can be seen as a mediation of both danger and uncertainty. One of the primary 
functions of the state can then be seen to provide order out of chaos, concretizing 
dangers/threats to separate friends from enemies, after which identifiable threats can be 
controlled. This might be viewed as a kind of simulation of order as per Baudrillard, 
where “simulation refers to the disappearance of the gap between the real and the 
imaginary” (de Lint, et al. 2007:1635).
Governance through simulation of order is extremely malleable, and could 
presume to extend its license into perpetuity, as new threats are constructed as quickly as 
others are identified and enterprises are extended with which to deal with them. As 
Anthony Giddens has described, as a consequence of conditions in late modernity6 and 
the subsequent rearticulation of social relations, “the more a given problem is placed 
precisely in focus, the more surrounding areas of knowledge become blurred for the 
individuals concerned, and the less likely they are to be able to foresee the consequences 
of their contributions beyond the particular sphere of their application” (1991:31). 
Concretization of dangers can work in tandem with simulations of order/information 
control (such as the ‘demonstration projects’ discussed by de Lint et al. 2007) to address 
the increasing unknowability that has been attributed to life in high/late/reflexive- 
modem societies, as will be discussed further shortly (though, I would argue, are not 
necessarily more welcome). Once again however, theoretically, if governments could 
succeed in entirely eradicating problems outlined in their broadening security efforts, 
their legitimacy through their capacity to provide order would be at stake.
That such an outcome of this seemingly paradoxical relationship would reach 
fruition seems implausible considering the proliferation of inchoate fears stemming from 
the increasing difficulty to ply information into predictable outcomes in 
high/late/reflexive- modernity (see Bauman, 2000; Beck et al. 2003; Giddens 1991). Jock 
Young (1998) has highlighted the production of a further obstacle to mediating chaos and 
order from within the state in the transition from an ‘inclusive’ to ‘exclusive’ society. The 
deviant ‘other’ who could be easily distinguished in the inclusive society epitomized by
6 The primary example offered by Giddens is the extension of ‘abstract systems’ (a combination o f  
symbolic tokens and expert systems) in place o f social institutions that have been ‘disembedded’ - lifted out 
of local contexts by the distanciation o f time and space (1991:17-18).
5
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Fordist work regimes became less distinguishable as market forces created a secondary 
labour force, transforming the human actors involved through increased uncertainty and 
job instability, thus creating new subcultures. Reflexively, the market economy cashed in 
on these new consumer demands, which normalized them into the everyday. The goal 
was no longer inclusion and reintegration, but marketing to individual desires; hence 
consumer conformity was replaced by a pluralism of lifestyles. Huysmans posits that 
such a phenomenon -  that of the stranger within the existing order -  creates the necessity 
for ordering to reduce “the possibility for chaos within the existing order” (1998:241).
The ontological insecurities created by strangers (insiders/outsiders who represent 
ambivalence) are ameliorated by the concretization of danger through risk 
assessment/sorting technologies where they can be categorized as friends/enemies. He 
argues that, ultimately, the function of the state system is not to eliminate enemies, but 
strangers -  its legitimacy resting on this ordering capacity (1998:242). This is consistent 
with Foucauldian literature that outlines the formation of a ‘govemmentality’ that is 
concerned with the knowledge of uncertainty in governing populations (Dillon, 2007; 
Foucault, 1991; Garland, 2002; Rose, 1999). This has led to the capaciousness of ‘expert’ 
knowledges which seek to create intelligibility and ordering mechanisms through the 
usage of statistics, accounting, biometrics, and actuarial risk-assessment, each with their 
own set of truth-telling practices about the knowledge of uncertainty (creating semblance 
of objectivity). Linked with the political, the process of classification is an integral part of 
social life, both informing and shaping/controlling moral order (Bajc, 2007:1572).
Gilles Deleuze (1992) has contributed to the discussion of the phenomena 
described above by describing a ‘society of control,’ different from the disciplinary 
society of closed systems (described at length by Foucault, 1991) in that it is a system of 
free-floating complex networks, where individuals in perpetual states of training and re­
learning are subject to accompanying ontological anxieties7. Most noteworthy within the 
context of the discussion here is that populations are no longer dealt with in the 
‘mass/individual’ pair, but have become ‘dividuals’ within databanks (1992:5), numerical 
bodies whose access can be regulated with at-a-distance monitoring technologies as
7 Here I concur with William Walters where he argues that it is better to think o f control as a ‘diagram’ as 
opposed to a form o f society because diagrams are more abstract, leaving open the possibility o f other 
equally valid ways o f diagramming the phenomena described by Deleuze (2006:193).
6
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discussed by Richard Jones (2000). Jones coins the term ‘digital rule’ to describe our 
regulation of movement through the social world by automatically-generated decisions at 
various electronic access points (ex: to computer systems or doors that require key cards) 
that allow/deny access based on the accumulation of digital information gathered at 
previous access points. He sees this as a new penology in that the exclusion of access can 
result in similar detrimental effects to traditional punitive measures. Automated gateways 
or checkpoints that one must pass through in order to participate in various aspects of the 
social world also require a divulgence of information that might be seen to threaten 
individual privacy/autonomy (failure to comply equating withdrawal of access privileges 
-  a form of coercive consent).
This kind of monitoring has been a useful tool for rendering strangers into 
categories of friends/enemies (reducing ontological insecurities). However, we see a 
further collapse of consent in favour of “information control and its simulation” (as per 
de Lint et al. 2007:1632). Beyond the immediate implications that monitoring has on 
trust, security politics can be seen to demand unequivocal amounts of trust from those 
who rely on the state to mediate their ontological insecurities where there is little 
transparency to be seen in processes of danger concretization. Both implications will be 
discussed further.
Thus, an axiomatic understanding of security should be abandoned in favour of 
situating securities studies within a wider discursive framework of meaning conducive to 
recognizing its relationship with the political. Governmental rationalities can then be seen 
to unfold such as those behind a simulation of order to support the concretization of 
threats/danger, as well as the development of new enterprises to fill spaces created 
through new technological developments. This approach will allow us “to question our 
will to truth; to restore discourse its character as an event; to abolish the sovereignty of 
the signifier” (Foucault, 1971:21).
In the remainder of this paper I will develop this research agenda within the 
context of internet governance in New Zealand, understood through the lens of ‘cyber- 
security,’ and the ‘security’ signifier more broadly. An examination of the concretization 
of danger and correlative information management, as well as the development of new 
enterprises in intelligible order-making will be derived from a complex array of
7
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interviews with participants from varying backgrounds and organisations. Interviews 
approached security as a theme pertaining to ongoing developments in electronic 
technology (mainly situated around the internet, critical infrastructure protection, and 
computer crime). A number of participants were also involved, either directly or through 
consultation, in the drafting of new legislation that would affect internet governance, or 
whose positions or experiences allowed them to offer technical or policy-oriented insight 
into this sphere. It should also be noted that these were collected early in 2002, when 
‘security’ issues were being reified in global political agendas in response to widespread 
publicity given the topic after the attacks on the World Trade Center in the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001.
CYBER-SECURITY: SIMULATION OF PERVASIVE THREATS
Peter Grabosky (2001) has posed the question of whether or not ‘virtual criminality’ is 
essentially ‘old wine in new bottles.’ The criteria with which he evaluates this question 
include examinations of offender motives, interpersonal relations in cyberspace, 
‘paradoxes of the digital age’ (technologies of anonymity and pseudonymity vs. increased 
threats to privacy due to potential state surveillance of public forums), its transnational 
dimensions, and responsibilities that come with the potential for computer crimes to 
implicate third-party liability. Ultimately, he argues that offender motives in cyberspace 
(greed, lust, power, revenge, adventure, the desire to taste ‘forbidden fruit,’ and potential 
intellectual challenges) are nothing new when compared with terrestrial criminal 
counterparts (2001:243-244, 248) and similarly, that challenges to the state necessitate 
the same kind of self-reliance that has become commonplace with changing roles of 
police (2001:245), although “the variety and number of opportunities for cybercrime are 
proliferating” (2001:248).
While this approach to the question of cybercrime attempts to separate some of 
the “overgeneralization and hyperbole ... [that] characterizes a great deal of discourse on 
the digital age” (Grabosky, 2001:243), it does not recognize that there are wider 
discursive performative functions at work in the positioning of ‘virtual’- or ‘cyber’-crime 
as separate from traditional crime -  that there are specific governmental rationalities 
instrumentalised under the rubric of ‘cyber-security.’ Grabosky’s approach might be
8
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categorized by Huysmans as a conceptual analysis, yet to yield a further degree of insight 
and sophistication into the proliferation of cyber-security enterprises depends on the 
analysis of the signifier within a widening ‘security milieu.’
As such, it might be more meaningful to re-visit the question of cybercrime, 
located as a concern of the broader signifier ‘cyber-security’ (being an object of cyber- 
msecurity), and question how its construction as such might be perceived to order social 
relations. Following from this, though the crimes linked with the concern for cyber­
security do contain common elements of terrestrial crime, the technological component 
(‘cyber-4, which connotes computers and information systems, virtual spaces, and the 
internet) has instigated new systems that specifically address cyber-security generally.
The importance here is that as long as cyber-security is perceived to be an 
exclusive phenomenon, it impacts ontological insecurities (potential for danger as a result 
of unknown threats) through its own utterance. This will be shown in the next section 
where political agendas seek to address this specific issue through the creation of new 
legislation, and where new enterprises appear that function to concretize danger and 
control it thusly. A further consequence of a ‘security’ signifier that deals with the virtual 
world is the problem of identifying strangers to be categorized as friends/enemies. Due to 
the complex networks that the internet relies on for functionality and the opaque nature of 
this connectivity that results, monitoring as a governmental technique is increasingly 
relied upon to create order out of this seeming chaos, as well as ‘expert’ knowledge 
systems that share information to negotiate risks and facilitate aleatory governance.
The following quote highlights the prevalence of governmental rationalities of 
information control/management; the participant was from the Cyber Crime Forum in 
New Zealand, in the process of establishing a Cyber Crime Centre for dissemination of 
information to a broad audience with the goal of being a convenient, single source:
The worth is going to be in the p erce ived  cred ib ility  o f  the Centre and the quality 
o f  what they produce. So i f  they do really good stu ff and they have some really 
good seminars, people w ill use it and the credibility o f  the Centre w ill grow (P10, 
Cyber-Crime Forum, em phasis added).
What is important is that as long as its credibility is perceived, its existence will be seen 
as justified -  it need not actually be successful in averting ‘actual ’ crime or keeping 
dangers at bay. This highlights the growth of effects-based governance as opposed to
9
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reliance upon original laws as the foundation of govemmentality8. This can be seen as a 
practice of rule where success is substituted for legitimacy (Dillon, [drawing from 
Foucault] 2007:42).
This can also be viewed as an expansion of efforts to govern ontological 
insecurities versus daily securities, exacerbated by the ominous ‘Shadow of No Towers’9 
-  the aftermath of September 11, 200110 -  reaching beyond historically-specific incidence 
to trespass on the boundaries of time and space, looming overhead and threatening to 
metamorphose into new (greater) danger at any given moment, potentially close to home. 
Giddens speaks to this as “the intrusion o f distant events into everyday consciousness, 
which is in some substantial part organized in terms of awareness to them” (1991:27, 
emphasis in original). The media certainly plays an important role here (as shown by 
Mathiesen, 1997; Urry, 2002); Giddens points out that “the media do not mirror realities 
but in some part form them” (1991:27).
The provision of ‘security’ then becomes something like a public relations 
exercise, where the main challenge is establishing credibility, a theme that was reiterated 
by interview participants ranging from systems administrators having difficulty 
convincing management to dedicate money to upgrading firewalls, anti-virus software 
licenses, etc., to the police in establishing (or expanding) monitoring as a necessary 
investigative technique, to private security companies in solidifying relationships with 
their clientele, to the CCIP in establishing credibility as a new government service. 
Certainly, many of these motivations were contested by other interests (fiscal frugality, 
protection of privacy, market competition). This often results in organisations seeking 
matrimony with ‘security’ to gain acceptance (a heightened political motivator after 
September 11, 2001), where gaining acceptance and credibility is difficult. A prime 
example of the staging of such a public relations exercise might be seen through the 
holding of an Internet Industry Forum; here, legitimacy for the goals of one set of
8 Original laws do, however, contribute to the process o f reflexivity that comes with negotiating further 
laws that would serve as new precedents to be followed, and effects-based governance does not operate 
outside the realm in which these laws exist (as per de Lint et al. 2005)
9 This phrase is borrowed from the title of Art Spiegelman’s book about 9/11.
10 Indeed ‘after/post- 9/11’ was continuously referenced as if  to indicate some Zeitgeist, as a qualifier for a 
paradigm shift with regard to global security awareness; often this was positioned as “the greater
good o f the whole outweighs the rights o f a few” (P18, Former Market Research Manager, International 
Data Corp)
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organisations was to be achieved by working in tandem with persons from already 
established organisations such as those within a government body, as the participant 
notes here:
P: There w as one thing that stood out, w as this point about this ‘new  
environm ent’ and that was something that they- they cam e up with the topic, 
what they wanted police to go and talk to them about. So that was their terms, i f  
you like, this ‘new  environment.’
Q: Okay. So they defined it rather than you?
P: Sure, yeah. And I mean, I w asn’t going to redefine it so I just, you know ...
Q: D id you agree with that general impression?
P: It’s probably not com pletely overstated, but computers have been around 
awhile and so has the Internet. I suppose increasingly computers are becom ing a 
greater part o f  our lives. And- but I don’t subscribe to the concept o f  carving o ff  
computer crime or cyber crime as distinct from criminal conduct generally [. . .] 
it doesn’t change the nature o f  the offence. It’s just a different [sic] tool for 
com m itting the crime. So to that extent they’re not new  crimes, they’re probably 
new  w ays o f  committing old crimes (P19, Crime Policy and Projects Officer, 
Criminal Investigation Branch).
We can see the irony in this example where the participant admitted that he didn’t even 
personally identify with the term ‘new environment’ that he was promoting. This may 
provide a hint toward the extent of informal relationships that are established between the 
public and private sector (ex: this could potentially be reciprocated by ISPs in informal 
information sharing to aid in an investigation at some point11).
Correspondingly, ‘security’ was often described as a ‘process’ of education and
awareness by participants in this research project -  the ‘human factor’ being teased out,
security even being defined at one point generally as ‘people.’ We can see how ‘security
as people’ is certainly a kind of rationality that epitomizes this struggle for credibility in
the legitimization of security issues. An obstacle for security providers could then derive
from opinions that New Zealand is not a site of imminent danger (ex: for ‘terrorist’
threats, industrial espionage, etc.):
W ell there’s no major threat to N ew  Zealand generated from overseas in the 
form, you know- there’s not [a] great terrorist threat here. There’s nobody doing 
any threat o f  invasion. So in that sense w e don’t need to ramp up police and
11 This was alluded to by many of the participants who worked in investigative capacities within 
government
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intelligence agencies to deal with the sort o f  threat that is so limited (P6, Green 
Party).
One participant mentioned how the corporate culture of New Zealand is even such that
any manager who would prioritize security “is quite often seen as being at the bottom of
the heap” (PI8, Former Market Research Manager, International Data Corporation).
Because internet connectivity in New Zealand had not yet developed to the same extent
as North America in terms of utilizing the country’s available bandwidth (connectivity to
perpetually online, high-speed broadband networks was in its infancy), nor did it have the
1 ?same reliance as in Australia (catapulted by e-govemment efforts ), some participants 
saw reduced opportunity for related security to be compromised. Many conceded, 
however, that with increasing connectivity and reliance on electronic networks, 
technological problems would likely become more prevalent (as such, they were not 
devoid of ontological insecurities about the potentiality of future danger)13.
Once again, what is conducive to this research agenda is recognizing some of the 
ways the politics of the signifier ‘security’ activate to order social relations. The 
multiplicity of viewpoints represented in the interviews attests to the ability of security 
utterances to reveal cadences of political identification14. The politics of the signifier 
‘security’ can also be seen to activate within different pairings with economic-, national-, 
cyber-, social-, etc. by participants depending on their motivations. For P6 (Green Party), 
it was New Zealand’s economic security in the face of competition with international 
markets that was the real issue at stake.
Some participants saw ambivalent attitudes toward security as threatening 
‘security’ itself. For them, New Zealand would become less secure or vulnerable if low- 
levels of awareness were not raised15. This sentiment is captured here:
12 This was discussed by P20, Network Security Consultant, E-Crime Solutions.
13 A brief note to eschew misinterpretation: attitudes toward security greatly varied among participants 
depending on their politics, professional investment, social experience, and other combinations o f factors, 
potentially ad infinitum. I am not attempting here to make generalized statements such as ‘most ISPs 
promote increased security measures’; the diverse backgrounds o f individual participants make this 
unfeasible.
14 This also contributes to online communities with shared ethics. A handful of participants went to some 
lengths describing the different moral codes o f hackers (P2), differentiating between ‘white hat’ and ‘black 
hat’ typologies (P30) and vigilante justice groups such as the Cyber Angels (P8).
15 This was not a universal consensus -  for example, one participant interviewed believed that extending 
government control to deal with security would create domestic discontent that would compromise security 
(P8, Green Party).
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I think you’ve always got to be aware. I mean, technology’s changing pretty 
much minute by minute [sic] and it’s just an awareness that you can be 
vulnerable. The same as we’re always looking for new techniques, new ways of 
doing things (P8, Department of Internal Affairs, Censorship Compliance Unit).
As such, resources are actually invested in raising ontological insecurities through
‘awareness’ measures, in turn legitimizing the functions of various ‘security providers.’
Incorporation of the ‘security’ signifier in dealing with technology or digital information-
related problems has helped to politicize particular issues, heightening their perceived
worth. One participant working for a major global player in the computer security
industry admitted that there is a ‘big hype’ where a lot of computer security companies
“create fear, uncertainty, and doubt around computer security because it sells their
product.” At one point, he went as far as saying:
We have to perpetuate the myth that all of these vulnerabilities are going to be 
the end of the world for you (PI 7, Team Leader, Information-Assurance Services 
Security Delivery, ‘X Company’16)
Going into this further, the participant justified this is as a matter of perpetuating the 
status quo -  that clientele are already interested because they might have recently read 
about a particular threat in Computerworld or watched it on CNN -  and his business just 
does what another security provider would offer anyway, but at a more competitive cost. 
That the participant’s company purportedly did not seek out new clients by instigating 
these insecurities may not affect much though, this being one of a number of private 
securities providers who noted a cultural shift in thinking about security, facilitated in 
large part by the media.
Mathiesen (1997) has described how dramas are staged to promote particular 
societal values, political agendas, etc. He calls this ‘synopticism,’ where the many watch 
the few; in composition it is diametrically opposed to Foucault’s iteration of Jeremy 
Bentham’s ‘panopticon’ (where the few watch the many), yet similarly, it is an ordering 
mechanism. Synopticism is a useful tool in the simulation of order. It may be seen here 
where participants drew on sensational examples to offer justification for ‘security’ 
practices specific to their interest, or noted an awareness of such things in media 
discourse.
16 This participant requested that the identity of his employer remain anonymous, ‘X Company’ being the 
chosen pseudonym.
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For example, the Mark Lundy murder case17 was drawn on by participants within 
the police service to highlight the forensic value of computers in solving ‘traditional’ 
crimes. Obviously, someone murdering their wife and daughter is not of the everyday, 
but its dramatic effect can be useful political fodder. Information-sharing, a vital part of 
police work, was seen to hinge on public perception of police credibility. A deficit in 
public willingness to respond or provide information to police based on a lack of 
understanding of what’s required in doing police work was reflected on here:
But it’s also the w illingness o f  these particular entities, for ISPs or T elcos18 or 
w ho it might be to provide us with information -  banks, power companies, local 
authorities, you know- a w hole range. And information is what police trade on. 
It’s what w e- i f  you haven’t got information you get nowhere. I f  w e can’t get it, 
w e have no job. I don’t think that really they can see with the difficulties, the 
changing environment around getting it (P19, Crime Policy and Projects Officer, 
Criminal Investigation Branch).
That “information is a commodity” (P21 E-Crime Lab, New Zealand Police) was a 
recurring theme (especially with respect to the importance of ‘human intelligence’) 
underlines how synoptic media valuations of police effectiveness are paramount to their 
success. Another example of the employment of synopticism, here to concretize danger, 
was where media coverage of the ‘cyber-stalking’ of children was conceived as 
intensifying political debates about drawing the line over freedom of expression and 
freedom of access to information, situating it in favour of a particular political agenda (PI 
from the Council of Civil Liberties).
Indeed, media characterization of potential threats was seen by some to have 
already translated into an effect on cultural perceptions of cyber-security. One participant 
noted that although the same vulnerabilities are coming out, the “level of security of 
organisations has changed,” seeing this as a change in culture (P30, Security Consultant, 
Deloitte Global). While this feeds into ontological insecurities (in mediating precedents 
with which to negotiate the potential for future calamities), it does not actually offer 
useful solutions, ergo:
17 Mark Lundy was convicted in April 2002 (his trial in progress during the interview collection) of 
murdering his wife and daughter in August 2000 -  this is noted as one o f the more complex and 
controversial trials in New Zealand’s history. Computer forensics were lauded as a key component in the 
conviction whereby it was found that the clock on Lundy’s computer had been manipulated, indicating 
premeditation.
18 This was a commonly used abbreviation for Telecommunications Companies.
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The community at large is not well-inform ed or educated onto cyber issues and 
the press don’t help, particularly because they tend to dramatise what does 
happen without- they give us the bad new s but they don’t tell us how to stop it 
(P I0, Cyber-Crime Forum).
A common conception among computer security professionals interviewed
(network/system administrators, private security providers, and independents) was that
security was a ‘process,’ and thus can never be fully realized. Important to them was that
at the end of the day it was perceived that they did the best they could, noting the
impossibility of reading up on all emergent vulnerabilities. Here is an example of the
impossibly wide expanse within which provision of computer security may be negotiated
within the context of system maintenance:
So rather than just saying ‘okay it does all it’s supposed to d o’ you have to look 
at [it] from ‘does it not do what it’s not supposed to do.’ So it’s kind o f  looking at 
[it] in the negative. (P30, Security Consultant, D eloitte Global).
Between mediated presentations of insecurities and the simulation of ordering 
ontological threats around concretized dangers, things could be seen to get confusing for 
laypersons. With regard to customers phoning into their ISP regarding computer 
problems:
There does [sic] tend to be a few  problems that are more, perhaps perception- 
based rather than actual reality, and so there’s a reasonable amount, because 
technology is not necessarily all that w ell understood (P I4, Network  
Administrator, Com N et [Industrial Research Ltd]).
One further aspect of the simulation of cyber-security, which will tie into the next 
section, is that simulation as might be seen effected through the introduction of 
‘piecemeal legislation’ to deal with perceived computer threats may be a result of the 
reflexivity that occurs in Taw’s shadow.’ Here “the reflexivity of law is understood [...] 
with the requirement that justice may also (simply) appear to be done as an iterative 
process, the last word of which may usefully be deferred for utterance elsewhere” (de 
Lint et al., 2005:69, emphasis added). Hence a seemingly incomplete set of legislation 
might be pushed forward to immediately respond to politicized issues, though it may be 
of little use in actually alleviating problems (or may proceed to create new problems as a 
result of inadequate consultation). That it is perceived to address the issues legitimates its 
existence, though further amendments could be necessitated after the fact.
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This resounds with a common complaint about much of the existing software 
architecture where security is not ‘designed in.’ What is being suggested there is that 
contingencies for ontological insecurities have to be built into new systems -  problematic 
if one is not able to accurately predict the future. Hence, open-source operating systems 
(such as Linux and UNIX®) are lauded for the benefit of being open to improvement by 
users, something closed-source systems (such as Microsoft operating systems19) do not 
allow.
NEW ENTERPRISES IN INTELLIGIBLE ORDER
As noted by Anthony Giddens, “expertise itself is increasingly more narrowly focused,
and is liable to produce unintended and unforeseen outcomes which cannot be contained
-  save for the development of further expertise, thereby repeating the same phenomenon”
(1991:31). This has been shown to be the case with the example of closed-source
software design where contingencies have not been designed into the architecture, and
with New Zealand’s Crimes Amendment Bill No 6, viewed here as:
[ . . . ]  a piecem eal approach which tends to be som ewhat knee-jerk to particular 
problems or perceived dangers or perceived needs. And in som e instances, not 
just at a legislative end but also sort o f  quasi-legislative regulation or other areas 
which [sic] have a loose sort o f  feel about them -  codes o f  practice and so on. 
They’re com pletely inconsistent (P22, Internet Society o f  N ew  Zealand).
As mentioned earlier, a govemmentality favouring effects-based policies and practices 
where merit is bestowed based on perceived worth (as opposed to actually doing 
‘justice’) often results in deferral of the last word to some indeterminate time in the 
future. The contestation that may result from unsatisfactory results in the interim may 
lead to new enterprises with which to deal with these problems.
Drawing again from the example of the Crimes Amendment Bill No. 6, it must be 
noted that this legislation did not occur in a vacuum. It was, in part, a response to existing 
legislation that was too narrowly focused to empower police with the ability to prosecute 
computer-related crimes such as denial of service attacks and theft of electronic
19 Microsoft’s system o f recognition of dealing with information provided to them by third parties 
identifying ‘bug’ fixes and potential backdoors into their OS was discussed by P13, an Independent 
Security Consultant.
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♦ 9 f )information (not encompassed in the definition of property in previously existing laws) . 
Police were not investigating electronic crime because there were no laws to create 
demand; once again, this returns us to the notion that perceived worth is a cardinal 
concern. Cyber-crime was seen as contributing to the ‘dark figure of crime’ -  that of 
unreported or undiscovered crimes that don’t make their way into official statistics (PI9, 
Crime Policy and Projects Officer, Criminal Investigation Branch). This feeds into 
discourse within police services where computer crimes were seen to be comprised only 
of traditional offences that made use of ‘new tools,’ or where new usage of computers 
was primarily associated with utilities to be incorporated into forensic work for 
traditional offences.
In the meantime, this allowed private securities companies to thrive on the legal
loopholes -  to provide services that the police couldn’t offer. In New Zealand then, the
private sector was often relied on to determine which security threats rotated the world of
cyber-space, and it was often the first line of defence. Private companies did, however,
face their share of challenges in the process:
[ . . . ]  yo u ’re hindered in the private sector to do a thorough investigation because 
the law is [sic] at the moment keyed up to the [sic] law enforcement like the 
police and various government agencies. And albeit it [sic] now  they’re not doing 
their job, hence it’s creating a market in the private sector, but the laws aren’t 
sort o f  open to the private sector yet to let us do the work (P27, E-Crime 
Investigations, Corporate Risks).
Working within the confines of the law, the private sector relied on the auspices of the 
state for certain investigative procedures such as search warrants of an individual’s 
private residence21. It was interesting to note that private firms could file for search 
warrants through the same channels as the public police, following through on the 
necessary paper work, to the point where the search warrant was granted. At that point, 
however, the investigation would be handed over to the police who were singularly 
empowered by the law to serve warrants, limiting private investigators. Even then police
20 Returning to the earlier discussion about whether or not cyber-crime can be differentiated from 
traditional crime, these legal discrepancies are shown here to order social relations in distinct ways.
21 Private companies were usually able to bypass the search warrant process at the site of their 
employer/client because if  the client had jurisdiction over their property (as was often the case), access 
could easily be granted. This was aided in cases where an employer had a computer use policy wherein it 
was stipulated that all data transpiring on workplace computers was property o f  the employer (worker 
access privileges contingent on consent), implications as discussed by Jones, 2000.
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would sometimes defer serving a warrant (though already lawfully validated) until 
convinced that certain criteria had been met to justify their involvement; this criteria was 
that a search warrant would likely lead to a conviction.
Because the police were of this prosecution mindset, work in the private sector 
often better complemented situations where the goal of clients was not prosecution (due 
to perceived public relations repercussions concerning a breach within their company, 
sensitive information surrounding a case, time and money, etc)22; private security 
contractors did not depend on prosecution as a measure of success; this was more a 
matter of whether or not the client had perceived that they had fulfilled their function .
The police position as principal investigator is still legitimized through state legal 
constructions, while at the same time allowing significant diffusion of resources through 
private sector alliances. This creates further opportunity for public-private partnerships, 
namely the establishment of informal information-sharing networks -  for police, access 
to information garnered by the private sector that waives the need to spend time wading 
through legally-prescribed bureaucracy; for the private sector it is often much the same -  
the relationship is reciprocal. Strategic alliances may also be formed between agencies 
with similar motivations or political agendas when legitimacy is at stake, as shown in the 
previous section.
Where legislation was languishing, security contractors were seen to prosper in 
the field of computer-related crime. This phenomenon will likely continue, especially in 
the highly-contested space surrounding ‘security’ issues because of “the accelerating 
speed and the unprecedented magnitude with which new technical artefacts are developed 
and moved to market, and with which new forms of knowledge are fabricated” (Stehr, 
2003:643). Due to the lengthy periods of time it takes for new legislation seeking to 
adequately address perceived emergent threats not dealt with in existing laws to be
22 In this, the computer-related crimes discussed here are similar to ‘white-collar’ and corporate crimes, 
where the private sector is called on instead of the police. In interviews with participants in police services, 
it was noted that such crimes (white collar, bank fraud etc) were usually absent from discussions of 
‘traditional’ crime or policing concerns, even though they are surely more prevalent than murder, which 
frequented the lips o f participants.
23Noted by a participant in the private security industry focusing on ‘electronic crime,’ they do balance 
what’s worth investigating based on statistics, though the perceived potential for success is not limited to 
prosecution potential but determined by the client’s desired outcome, often to find out how a security 
breach was made to inform future prevention (P27, E-Crime Investigations, Corporate Risks).
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enacted, new enterprises will emerge to meet market demand. This is consistent with the 
often-iterated prediction among participants that the internet would become both more 
secure (where security technologies were improving) and less secure (where there emerge 
more imaginative ways to abuse it). One participant likened this to climbing two sides of 
a pyramid, where it was undetermined whether you would get to the top or not (P10).
Nico Stehr has stated that “an analysis of the governance of knowledge in modem 
society has to be cognisant of the general practical incompleteness, fragility, 
obsolescence -  and often, failure -  of projects aimed at governance in modem societies” 
(Stehr, 2003:645). Certainly governance of electronic crime in New Zealand was seen to 
be highly contested, and the legislation that was being established at the time of the 
interviews discussed here seemed destined for revision in the not-too-distant future due to 
a number of perceived problems.
Some of these problems were believed to arise from a lack of transparency in the 
drafting of legislation. It was purported to be extremely difficult for citizens to access a 
copy of the Supplementary Order Paper for the Crimes Amendment Bill No. 6 (ex: it was 
not made available online), and was badly promoted in terms of the consultative process, 
relying solely on the knowledge of a select committee. After considerable efforts to gain 
access to the consultative process of the Supplementary Order Paper (having to 
constantly monitor various places to keep up to speed with the legislation), the Internet 
Society of New Zealand helped effect the addition of two new crimes24. Unfortunately 
they included very wide provisions such as seven years’ imprisonment for Denial of 
Service attacks. For these, there was no opportunity for formalized debate before they 
were presented to the House. Eventually, they were able to get one word changed25 (P22).
That drafting of legislation was closed to specific groups did not seem to be out of 
the ordinary. For example, the Consumer Protection Bill sought consultation from the 
Ministry of Economic Development (MED) who were concerned with copyright 
protection. As such, private agendas are summarily concretized in law. The consultative 
committee for the Crimes Amendment Bill was comprised primarily of police, the 
Internet Safety Group (concerned with child pornography), and the largest ISPs
24 It was not clear from the source what these additional crimes were.
25 Once again, it was not clear what the wording was specifically -  its inclusion here is to capture general 
concerns participants had with the legislative process.
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(Yahoo!Xtra and Clear Communication Ltd.); beyond that, most ISPs were not involved 
despite potentially crippling economic burdens the legislation could impose on them. An 
example is that the Telecommunications Interception Capability Bill (a companion bill to 
Crimes Amendment Bill No. 6) criminalizes network operators’ failure to provide clean 
interception capability (log files) to assist with police investigations ; this would require 
allocation of substantial resources just to store the log files for a minimum period of time, 
shown to be a huge cost to ISPs in the UK with the exercise of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). It was perceived that this could also create a 
dampening effect where costs would be passed on to consumers, especially if police felt 
compelled to employ interception powers pre-emptively and with more frequency fearing 
that data might soon be wiped27. Neither was the Minister of Justice’s response to these 
concerns (‘don’t worry, the police would never prosecute [ISPs]’) seen to be comforting 
(P22).
A further concern was that the Consumer Protection Definition of Goods and
Services Bill sought to change the definition of goods and services under, in particular,
the Consumer Guarantees Act due to a particular court decision ruling that electricity was
not a good and its supply was not a service, and therefore wasn’t covered by guarantees
given to consumers under that act. One participant commented on how this reading of the
legislation didn’t respond to the way people normally think about goods:
[. . . ]  it w ill dictate that anything carried over an electronic network effectively is 
a good, and that its delivery is a service. And effectively  that’s all they’ve done. 
And what that means is when you slot those definitions into the Consumer 
Guarantees A ct [sic] the guarantees are for things like ‘it’s got to be fit for the 
purpose, y o u ’ve got to have clear title to it,’ -  in other words, you ’ve got to own  
it in order to sell it. It’s got to be sa fe ... o f  reasonable quality. N ow  how on earth 
do you fit those guarantees into the delivery o f  an email? (P22, Internet Society  
o f  N ew  Zealand).
Once again, it was of the opinion that little technical specialist input was received before 
the legislation was drafted -  rather, it came about in response to perceived problems.
In direct opposition to the Crimes Amendment Bill No. 6 was the 
Telecommunications Privacy Code, the result of efforts from the Privacy Commissioner
26 This bill also gives the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Security 
Bureau (GCSB) the power to intercept emails.
27 Demonstrating a limited timeframe within which an investigation could be carried out was seen to help 
expedite the warrant process (PI9).
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to try and balance out what he perceived to be threats to civil liberties as a result of the 
increased monitoring capacity that was being given to police, the Security Intelligence 
Service (SIS), and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). He was, 
however, seen to be simplifying the problem by moving the boundary back a step further 
in proposing that ISPs be required to remove traffic information permanently after six 
months. The problem here was seen that as soon as a period is specified, it may be too 
long (where ISPs can’t keep huge amounts of information due to cost) or too short (for 
law enforcement purposes). Of significant worth here is that there was seen to be a high 
degree of exceptionalism in singling out ISPs and Telcos from other industries that hold 
customer information potentially as useful to police investigations, such as banks, 
insurance companies, and travel agents (P22).
This legislation can be seen as the result of efforts to address potential threats 
loosely related to ‘cyber-security’ along a diverse array of political agendas. The desire to 
deal with ontological insecurities of ‘not knowing’ are implicit in Crimes Amendment 
Bill No. 6 where the monitoring capacity of the GCSB was extended, which could 
potentially aid with the categorization of strangers (chaos) into friends/enemies (order) 
and thus, be dealt with28. In contrast, the Privacy Commissioner was attempting to 
remove the possibility of not knowing whether or not one is being watched by stripping 
government agencies of the tools to do so. Cyber-security was activated here as a 
political motivator, instigating wider definitions of terminology used within legislation. 
This could be seen as an application of what Martin Innes refers to as ‘control creep,’ 
where social control apparatuses have been used by governments in a way that 
“progressively expands and penetrates (or ‘creeps’) into different social arenas,” in 
response to vague fears about security in late-modernity (2001:1).
In addition to legislation put forward to deal with these issues, a number of other 
enterprises could be seen as aspiring to contribute to concretization of danger, such as the 
creation of a Cyber Crime Centre (discussed earlier within the context of simulation) and, 
most notably, the newly conceived Centre for Critical Infrastructure housed within the
28 The GCSB’s function has been described generally as spying on other countries (P5, Independent 
Watchdog), more specifically, through the interception and analysis o f foreign communications (de Lint, 
forthcoming), and also the monitoring o f the foreign element within New Zealand (PI, Council o f Civil 
Liberties). In essence, concretizing danger and stripping the stranger o f anonymity -  possibly the enterprise 
in intelligible order-making in New Zealand.
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GCSB -  a ‘watch and warn’ service with a mandate to assist in the protection of New 
Zealand’s national critical infrastructure from information-borne threats (de Lint, 
forthcoming). These might appear redundant considering there are already a number of 
related services in widespread usage (such as CERT®29), and yet their legitimacy was 
accepted by participants as contingent on future perceived worth. It seems unlikely that 
resources would have been deployed for these programs were there not sufficient 
ontological insecurities running amok with which to face.
As Giddens has noted, “Expert knowledge does not create stable inductive arenas;
new, intrinsically erratic situations and events are the inevitable outcome of the extension
of abstract systems” (1991:31). It is within these new arenas, with their erratic situations
that new projects to deal with insecurities are created. New industries emerge here to
thrive in gaps of seeming unintelligibility to restore order or address perceived problems;
in many cases this is merely an exercise in simulation of order where knee-jerk reactions
are not seen to contribute to long-term solutions. As was demonstrated previously,
unknown dangers often become misrepresented through concretization (hype) in order to
aid in perceived credibility and public acceptance (in many cases to promote a ‘security’
product). Transparent in this process is the fact that knowledge with relation to security is
highly tenuous, and because of the limitless scope of potential security concerns, it is
unrealistic that one provider should presume ownership of any semblance of ‘complete
knowledge’ about potential security issues, as captured by this participant:
So there are probably always going to be things that I don’t know about that 
som eone else may find that- and that just com es with the territory, and that’s- 
that’s just, you know, something you have to live with you know. I mean, you ’re 
never going to find everything -  you can try and do is raise the level o f  security 
to a standard that’s, you know, good enough for them (P30 Security Consultant, 
Information Security Services Team, Deloitte).
Because of the insurmountable scale of existing information pertaining to security 
knowledge, citizens must allocate increased levels of trust in security professionals and 
third-party sources. This will be discussed in the following section, along with the 
relationship between trust and monitoring, used as a tool to channel ontological 
insecurities.
29 Computer Emergency Response Team
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ONTOLOGICAL INSECURITY, TRUST & MONITORING
As previously mentioned, following the transition from an inclusive modem society that 
reached its pinnacle with Fordist work regimes to an exclusive society typical of a 
high/late/reflexive- modem era (see Young, 1998), comes the intensification of ‘the 
stranger among us.’ This was seen by Huysmans (1998) to be a challenge to the state 
whose legitimacy rests on its capacity to provide order, the stranger being an unknown 
element -  an insider/outsider - having an inimical relationship with the process of this 
order making. Strangers must be identified before the categorization of friends and 
enemies can proceed. As such, monitoring is seen as an indispensable asset in this 
capacity.
Giddens has outlined an unyielding exchange between monitoring and trust, 
whereby “trust presumes a leap to commitment, a quality of faith which is irreducible. It 
is specifically related to absence in time and space, as well as to ignorance. We have no 
need to trust someone who is constantly in view and whose activities can be directly 
monitored” (1991:19). This ‘trust leap’ is elaborated on by Guido Mollering, where the
TOleap of faith from the kinds of weak inductive knowledge that inform some state of 
favourable expectation involves a ‘suspension’ of time and space that serves to bracket 
the unknowable “thus making interpretative knowledge momentarily certain” (2001:403). 
Mollering develops this further, positing that ‘suspension’ cannot exist independent of 
interpretation, and that, “if suspension emphasizes the illusory and indifferent character 
of trust [...] this is balanced by the continual and reflexive nature of interpretation” 
(2001:414).
Bringing this into Huysmans’ discussion of security, monitoring is intended to 
reduce ontological insecurity and anxiety (fear of not knowing) by reducing the need to 
trust, giving further meaning to the expression ‘keep your friends close, and your 
enemies closer.’ Monitoring becomes self-reflexive where there is an element of trust
30 Mbllering’s main source is Georg Simmel, also drawn on by Giddens. Though the importance o f the 
‘leap o f faith’ is expanded by Giddens through his discussion o f the nature o f the leap to commitment, 
particularly his notion that we don’t need to trust what can be monitored, here ‘visibility’ tends to 
overshadow the interpretation of ‘good reasons’ and how this is translated into expectations. Though 
monitoring can certainly remove some o f the ambiguities which necessitate the element o f faith, as well as 
provide a basis for interpretation, it does not address how “interpretations do not translate directly into 
expectations” (Mollering, 2001:415).
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invested in the practise itself, particularly when its means of determinability is evaluated. 
The favourable expectation of making ambiguities known invokes a quality of faith 
toward this end result (where time and space is momentarily suspended), so monitoring 
must be turned in on itself in order to evaluate its merit (to ‘monitor monitoring,’ so to 
speak). Of course, there is always some ontological insecurity when attempting to predict 
the future (due to the inability to realize every potential unknown), and so the process of 
monitoring, in terms of its relationship to trust, is doubly linked. Theoretically, the 
paradox of monitoring in this capacity is realized where, if all ambiguities were to be 
revealed through its efforts, it would no longer serve any useful purpose.
As was shown to be the case with systems administrators who relied on ‘watch 
and warn’ bulletins and newsgroups to secure their networks, trust played a role where 
they needed to monitor vast sources of data to keep up with knowledge. The monitoring 
function served to alleviate the need to rely on the kind of trust described by Giddens, yet 
as was noted, they could never be fully informed, thus, needing to trust that they did all 
they could do at the end of the day. Trust is pronounced here again where they negotiated 
which security services to subscribe to -  this was usually influenced by reputation 
(presence in the media, review sources, standing within trusted networks, etc) or business 
relationships that their organisation actually had with these services; in both cases, 
visibility is a factor. Security professionals also avoided services that did not provide 
frequent updates, so as to limit the need to prolong suspension of trust (that viruses or 
systems intrusion will not occur in the interim) or for further reliance on trust (consequent 
to initiating relationships with new security providers). We can also see here how this 
relationship between monitoring (visibility) and trust would be an important aspect in 
enterprises’ vying for public credibility (and so synoptic practises proliferate).
Tying trust into the previous discussion of the sphere within which ‘security’ 
enterprises can emerge to alleviate ontological anxieties, we can see their success 
potential elevated by increased needs of the layperson to rely on trust where the 
enormous scale of information available about potential dangers is coupled with the 
unlimited unknown of potential dangers themselves; this does not allow for any deficit of 
trust. Once again, Giddens observed that “[i]n respect of expert systems, trust brackets
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the limited technical knowledge which most people possess about coded information 
which routinely affects their lives” (1991:19).
As was remarked earlier, the legitimacy of the state often rests on its capacity to 
provide order, contributing to the definition of friends and enemies, constructed alongside 
particular political agendas. The element of ambiguous threats is then both a challenge to 
order-making while at the same time, of crucial importance to ensuring further demands 
for these efforts. Ambiguous threats that are seen to be borderless (‘terrorists,’ hackers, 
cyber-stalkers) can be represented as both national and domestic security issues. 
Outsiders/insiders who bear the visage of the stranger must first be seen as either friends 
or enemies before they can be dealt with through monitoring techniques. Expansion of 
the GCSB’s monitoring capacity, as well as its ability to intercept communications of 
foreign elements within New Zealand31 (with only ministerial oversight, thus subject to 
partisan political bias) could be seen as an example of how the foreign (stranger) is 
viewed as a potential enemy that needs to become known.
Aside from the monitoring of ‘the stranger within and without’ by the GCSB, 
police services relied on a moralistic hierarchy to determine who should be the subject of 
monitoring, and for what kinds of crime. This was, in large part, due to resource restraints 
where there were only 6,000 police officers in a country of almost four million people. 
As one individual noted, “it is only used for the most serious crimes” (PI9). An example 
can be seen with the monitoring done by the Censorship Compliance Unit, concerned 
with online traders of child pornography.
Relevant to its discussion is Charles Tilly’s position that centralized governmental 
regimes actually depend on ‘illicit trust networks’ (such as those formed on the internet) 
for actual execution of top-down plans (2004:15, also see Holquist, 1997). Since 
networks generally operate within existing social or systemic archetypes, regardless of 
the beneficence of this relationship, they can be prone to surveillance from others with 
access to these systems. The employment of computerized surveillance to identify 
potential threats was the primary resource tool for the Department of Internal Affairs’
31 The defined parameters were so broad as to provide means to capture within their gaze companies that 
are part of a corporate body or its subsidiary incorporated outside NZ, companies that have controlling 
shares in other countries (including foreign-owned banks), unincorporated bodies that are part o f foreign 
organisations (which could include trade unions), and persons acting in their capacity as an agent or 
representative o f any government, body, or organisation as per those examples just outlined (PI).
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Censorship Compliance Unit, which was primarily concerned with eradicating child
pornography from the internet. The investigative monitoring techniques of this
organisation are summarized by this participant:
What happens, w e got onto a channel and there may be, say, fifty people from all 
‘round the world and there may be a couple o f  N ew  Zealanders flat-out trading. 
What w e try to do is to encourage them to send us material. W e’re in a public 
area. There are [sic] no entrapment issues because all yo u ’re doing is getting 
them to do what they normally avail them selves to do. In the majority o f  cases 
w e get approached by them. (P8, Department o f  Internal Affairs, Censorship 
Com pliance Unit).
That the participant described the Censorship Compliance Unit’s interaction with 
participants as getting them to do “what they normally avail themselves to do” should not 
go without comment; it denotes a pre-emptive rationale consistent with other participants 
who employed surveillance techniques, which rests on the underlying insecurity that an 
offence looms in the future. The perception of mens rea (guilty mind) is often enough to 
legitimize the employment of monitoring32.
There seemed to be a recurring in-group/out-group discourse prevalent among 
many participants that stated monitoring was a large part of their work, which could 
potentially be attributed to the mentality that is required for the task (looking for 
‘others’). Often these participants mentioned that they were frequently engaged in 
information-sharing practices within networks of similarly-tasked people, sometimes 
hesitant to rely on support outside of these groups. An example here is that the 
Censorship Compliance Unit did not use any external contractors for their own computer 
security, rather, they relied on information from similar enforcement trust networks, 
where problems were posted in group forums and someone within the group would 
suggest how to come up with a solution. Another example of trust being conferred based 
on perceived common interests is where a private investigator mentioned that all of their 
staff were ex-police, however, once they left the police service, they were no longer 
trusted (P25, E-Crime Investigations, Corporate Risks).
Neither did there seem to be a great deal of trust toward agencies that monitor 
communications among other participants. The GCSB was often referred to as a ‘spy
32 This is not intended as a criticism, just observation (another observation is that this has not proved itself 
as an effective preventive technique, especially where the participant indicated that they often find 
themselves serving search warrants on the same few individuals).
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agency,’ and some participants expressed concern that the CCIP would be located within 
its wings. From the perspective of the CCIP, it was seen that being tucked within a 
branch of the GCSB could come with the benefit of access to many of the GCSB’s 
resources. Within the context of this discussion, a potential strategic benefit could be that 
this might expedite the perceived credibility of the CCIP for foreign governmental 
agencies who have a relationship with the GCSB, helping to facilitate information flow33. 
Also, from a public relations perspective, were the CCIP to be revealed in the eyes of the 
public as existing for a shared common good (ex: New Zealand’s critical infrastructure), 
it might help to alleviate some of the negativity compounded for the GCSB over the years 
(for examples, see de Lint, forthcoming).
Further problems experienced in monitoring practises stemmed from the result of 
the opaque nature of connectivity on the internet. Encryption technology has become 
more widespread in response to growing fears about privacy and data mining, inhibiting 
investigations34. There is also an element of trust that has to be allocated to the perceived 
reliability of digital signatures where the identity of the person who supposedly 
originated the signature can never be truly known, tying into concerns with rampant 
online fraud. An additional challenge faced by enforcement agencies in dealing with 
computer crimes was that they had to place individuals at the scene of the crime, which 
was particularly difficult in cases where there happened to be multiple users. One 
participant conceded that at the end of the day, all they really have to rely on is 
circumstantial evidence.
Though the GCSB, SIS and police services of New Zealand were allowed 
unprecedented interception and monitoring capabilities through the Crimes Amendment 
Bill No. 6, government agencies did not hold a monopoly over the identification of
33 In response to whether or not they have a memorandum o f understanding with other agencies, a 
participant from the CCIP said “No, it’s the fact that w e’re part of the club, I guess. Having established the 
CCIP here they see that as an equivalent organization and they’re quite happy to exchange with us” (P23).
34 There was actually a debate occurring amongst participants about encryption/decryption. From an 
enforcement perspective, encryption was seen as a tool used by criminals to mask their identity when 
committing online crimes, whereas to some security consultants, encryption was a useful tool for protecting 
against online info/identity theft (credit cards, etc). There was also talk about whether or not it should be an 
ISP’s responsibility to provide police with decryption tools; from an enforcement perspective, it was 
thought that ISPs have a ‘social responsibility’ for crimes that their network helped facilitate (lack o f police 
resources feeding into this), whereas from an ISP perspective, forcing them to provide such tools would 
also come at great costs, referencing the exclusory principle o f holding ISPs responsible (ex: police don’t 
hold telephone companies responsible for crimes that their phone lines may have helped facilitate).
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potential threats with which to concretize danger, nor were they seen to be the most 
active contributors to provision of ‘cyber-security,’ particularly with regard to electronic 
crime (as a result of the legal limitations outlined earlier35). Systems administrators and 
private security companies were also actively involved in this line of work, and thus often 
relied on forms of monitoring before they could concretize danger or identify the source 
of a perceived threat.
As such, they were also subject to many of the same problems, especially because
the internet is essentially a borderless entity, where remote access can be established from
anywhere globally, and where the e-crime is transparent in nature. When securing
networks, a major problem was how to let in the ‘good guys’ and keep out the ‘bad guys’
(PI7). Intrusion detection systems were set up to monitor activity on networks and
servers, as well as programs to monitor workplace computer stations; however, according
to participants it was impossible to monitor all activity due to sheer scale. The following
quote exemplifies these issues:
P2: Yeah, w e ’re keeping track o f  som e o f  the things, like file access and w ho’s 
[sic] deleting files and all that. Things like dialling up from home or remotely -  
that’s all being logged.
PI: W eb access is logged.
P2: Yeah, all the w eb access. A ll access to our servers is logged as w ell and the 
firewall logs -  all the traffic in and out, anyway.
P I : Too much to read through.
P2: Yeah, it’s way too much data to read.
P I : It w ould only be i f  an incident happened to som eone.
P2: Y ou ’d be able to trace it back.
P I : What- what happened then- it w ould be our job  to try and find out.
Q: So you basically log all that stuff for forensic purposes rather than actual 
monitoring?
P2: N o. W e’re supposed to be monitoring it as w ell- it’s just that w e don’t get 
time and so a lot o f  it ends up for forensic purposes later in, yep (P3, System  
Administrators, ‘Government Department’).
35 The Censorship Compliance Unit would be an exception here because their work concentrated on public 
forums.
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Many companies were seen to be moving towards adopting computer use policies 
stipulating that any data on work computers would belong to them. This helped to 
facilitate monitoring by private investigators and systems administrators without the need 
for search warrants. The steering of information flow through specific channels, 
password usage at workstations, pre-registration with systems administers who regulated 
different levels of user access, compartmentalization of critical data and the regulation of 
physical access through use of electronic key cards were all techniques employed to 
varying degrees to reduce reliance on trust36.
To sum up this section, monitoring was seen as a tool to filter ontological 
insecurities into recognizable categories of friends and enemies. This was shown with the 
GCSB’s increased capacity to monitor foreign elements within New Zealand. The 
practise of monitoring has a direct effect on trust, where monitoring is used to decrease 
reliance on trust for those who employ it. Because of the opaque nature of the internet 
and increased user anonymity, monitoring becomes more difficult but is employed more 
regularly to decrease this trust reliance. Information pertaining to security is often 
handled by organisations that have little organisational transparency, especially with 
regard to monitoring practises, and this also creates an increased reliance on trust. Trust 
networks that facilitated flow of information between similarly-tasked organisations were 
also shown to be present. Policies and practises within organisations reflected ontological 
insecurities about perceived future unknowns and incorporated the means with which to 
monitor employees, also employing various means with which to regulate access. But the 
questions remain: is the effect that potentially being monitored (ex: by the GCSB) has on 
others’ ontological security worthwhile? Conversely, does having to place more trust in 
organizations with little transparency in their securitization practices eliminate 
ontological anxieties? Do these lead to harm reduction? These questions will be explored 
in the following, final section.
36 For a further discussion o f the implications of these practises, see Jones, 2000.
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SECURITY POLITICS: AT ODDS WITH HARM REDUCTION?
Before concluding this examination of security, let us give brief pause to the nature of
(security) knowledge itself. It has been argued that equating ‘information’ and
‘knowledge’ bypasses the issue of trust, knowledge being “information that can be
trusted,” whereas information alone is as yet undetermined and unfiltered (Brodeur and
DuPont, 2006:11). The general argument is worth noting, though it could be better
resituated within the aforementioned discussion of trust. Undetermined and unfiltered
information should then be seen as that which has yet to be allocated an expectation to
inform the interpretative process involved in the mental process of trust, whereas
knowledge may be seen as a suspension between interpretation and favoured expectation.
This accommodates the notion that ‘knowledge’ can be highly capricious, vulnerable to
collapse in the event that expectations are not met. It is only a suspended commitment
that bridges the gap between knowledge and ignorance. Thus discursively oriented, it
sheds light on the following:
Y ou ’ve also got to be quite careful about creating -  what w ould be the right word 
to describe it -  i f  a lot o f  people say it’s so, then it becom es fact. So i f  one person 
says ‘okay I’ve seen this vulnerability’ and it gets passed around, suddenly when  
it com es back you say ‘yeah, that must be right, i f  he said so .’ It may [sic] be 
incorrect. So there’s a phrase to describe that (P10, Cyber-Crime Forum).
The wariness this participant had with regard to the self-reflexive nature of adopting 
potentially untenable foundations on which knowledge about security vulnerabilities are 
constructed is interesting. Many participants shared the sentiment that information about 
security cannot necessarily be trusted, a rational standpoint considering the limitless 
scope of what ‘security’ might entail, and depending on whose interests are at heart in its 
fabrication. Contributing a specific vulnerability to public discourse can create precedents 
that, once concretized (politicized), can impede further discussion. This can also 
contribute to processes that substitute deferral for the last word.
Willem De Lint and Sirpa Virta (2004) have argued that security should retain a 
semblance of ambiguity to promote harm reduction by reducing the ontological 
insecurities that have been fostered in political agendas, consistent with Foucault’s notion 
that “the operation and proliferation of mechanisms of security continually inflated the 
concern with security” (Dillon, 2007:45). De Lint and Virta posited that there needs to be
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“a rejection of the association between security, certainty, and authority” (2004:465),
where defining security as a particular problem narrows the realm of contestation and
debate known as ‘the political,’ as was discussed earlier. Many participants also
suggested that if security is too narrowly defined, other problems, potentially as
important, could be overlooked. The lack of transparency involved in negotiating security
threats before they are filtered to the public creates an increased reliance on trust that ‘the
experts’ know what they’re doing. The politics of the security signifier often activate to
propel ‘security’ issues to top priority, yet, as the following participant noted, create
further secrecy surrounding such issues:
[ . . . ]  stu ff that is inherently open becom es tainted by security simply because 
anything that security touches has to be considered secure and confidential (P28, 
IP Architect, Telstra Clear).
In this way, security issues have been likened to investigative police work (as opposed to 
preventive techniques) where ‘you can’t say too much too soon’ (P10) and the 
surrounding area has to be locked down to protect the chain of evidence from 
contamination. The drawback of this was seen to be that warnings for problems weren’t 
coming out fast enough (P10).
Buying into a security agenda whereby there is fear of some ambiguous external 
threat can be seen to encourage a license into perpetuity for means with which the state 
can unmask strangers at home, ordering citizens into categories of friends and enemies 
that can then be regulated (through control of mobility). Thus, the intra-state practices 
that follow from security agendas put forward by governments serve to both alleviate 
ontological insecurities that come with unknowability (strangers), while legitimizing the 
state’s ability to create perceived order. This was demonstrated though the increased 
monitoring capacity of the GCSB in New Zealand made possible by the Crimes 
Amendment Bill No. 6 and Supplementary Order Paper No. 85. The Associate Justice 
Minister, under whose aegis this legislation was promulgated, was widely reported in the 
media as saying that ‘law-abiding New Zealanders have nothing to fear from the 
proposals’ (PI).
As Lucia Zedner has observed with regard to the marketing of security products, 
“far from alleviating the fears that led to their purchase, these products provide users with 
daily palpable reminders of the very risks they seek to avoid” (2003:165). In relation to
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fears about electronic threats, this can be applied to the usage of antivirus and spyware 
protection software. As was shown earlier, it is these types of ontological insecurities 
however that create the spaces within which security providers rely on to function (often 
taking advantage of this to promote the legitimacy of their product).
Figure 1 (see next page) demonstrates how the concretization of security is bound 
to a cyclical process that serves to create further insecurity: Here we can see a 
multidimensional reflexivity bound to the performative function of ‘security’ that can 
illuminate this process. Beginning with ontological insecurities based on unknown fears, 
monitoring and information-gathering is used to make strangers and potential threats 
known. Once potential threats become known, they can be categorized into friend/enemy 
dichotomies, informed by political agendas, commercial interests, etc. Once enemies are 
constructed/fabricated, they can then be concretized as dangers through mediated events 
and synoptic practices; this process creates a perceived determinability (often used to 
legitimize security providers or agencies from which these results originate). This 
perception that future unknown threats can be determined perpetuates further ontological 
insecurities about ‘not knowing’ -  this time about the potential for both new unknown 
threats in addition to anxiety about not being able to cope with politicized dangers (this is 
why I say the reflexivity is multidimensional), thus leading back to further monitoring to 
address these fears and create order out of chaos and so on ad infinitum.
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Figure 1
Ultimately then, it is argued here that more transparency is required, particularly 
in legislative processes that seek to address vague fears about insecurity. Inconsistencies 
in legislation opened a space for new enterprises to emerge to deal with perceived threats, 
as was the case of private security companies that worked in the spaces between police 
jurisdiction (though limits to the extent of their powers led to reliance on the police to 
sometimes take part, helping to establish informal networks for information-sharing). 
Expanding the powers of monitoring agencies as was seen in New Zealand should be 
required to have the same kinds of justification as the expansion of punitive faculties, 
because often the results infringe upon private citizens (as per Jones, 2000; Zedner, 
2003), often in pre-emptive restrictions of access. The mentality that danger is always 
looming in the distance, as was seen in the case of New Zealand’s Censorship 
Compliance Unit, sometimes leads to pre-emptive rather than preventive strategies that
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hinge on particular agendas. Such was also the case with the GCSB’s monitoring of 
foreign elements in New Zealand, where danger was presumed to abound, the only 
oversight being located in the ministerial realm, suspect to political influence. Many 
responses to perceived security threats were also seen to be only simulations of order, 
relying on perceived credibility as opposed to proven worth at preventing threats; this 
leads to further reliance on trust, especially where continuing technological advances do 
not allow for self-reliance in governing the limitless realm of unknown threats. It should 
be recognized that ‘security’ utterances are accompanied by ontological anxieties and 
have a performative power in ordering social relations, and therefore, more care must be 
given to limit their frequent usage.
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